A different moral theory

A dance begins because a dancer starts dancing. But who is starting to dance? It is not a dancer since he would have to be previously dancing to be a dancer. However, he is beginning the dancing; hence there was no dancing before him. So for a dance to come into existence, you need a dancer, but to have a dancer, you need dancing. Where is the separation between the dance and the dancer? At what point did the dancer exist without the dancing or the dancing exist without the dancer? A moral person is moral because he considers murder wrong. But why is murder wrong? It’s because killing someone violates some moral code- but why does it violate some moral code? Because someone thinks it is wrong. But for someone to consider it wrong, he needs to be moral? However, he can only be moral if he considers it wrong from before. There is no differentiation between the dancer and the dance, between the person and his morals- they are intrinsically embodied in one. This is the cornerstone of the moral theory I will espouse over the course of this essay- the source of all morality is within us humans- morality is a human concept which does not exist without the existence of the perpetrator. To paraphrase Descartes, cogito ergo mudus talis est- I think, therefore, the world is as it is. In the context of this theory, it would be ‘I think wherein the concepts of good and bad have meaning.’ Locke argued for the primary and secondary qualities of objects- heat was not a primary quality.[1] Berkeley even argued that size was not a primary quality, since it depended on the distance of the observer from the object. In the same way- color, shape, texture can be discarded as primary qualities since they depend on the initial conditions of the observer. I argue that the goodness or badness of an action, in the same way as the size of an object, depends on the observer. Widespread moral disagreement, which is one of the main arguments against other moral theories, is the reason why we must reject ‘good’ to be a concept independent of the observer. We can see this in Moore’s question where a contrast can be seen between the two terms “Water is H20” and “Good is pleasant” or “Good is this or that”, a universalization of the concept of good which could not have fit in my initial conclusion that the concept of good is embodied in the human. “Water is H20” is an analytic proposition whose predicate concept is included in its subject concept and ‘good is pleasant’ is a synthetic proposition where the concept of good does not contain in it the concept of a ‘pleasant thing’. Why the concept of good does not do so is due to the widespread moral disagreement prevalent in the world. As mentioned by Louis Pojman[2], there are numerous examples from around the world where logically opposite actions are considered pleasant. However, logically opposite actions, conceptually cannot be contained in the same concept of ‘good’. Thus ‘good’ cannot contain in it the concept of a ‘pleasant thing’. Thus, since we cannot universalize ‘good’ as an objective principle independent of the observer, it must depend subjectively on the observer. There is no separation between ‘good’ and the observer, just as there is no separation between the dance and the dancer.
Now that we have cornered the source of morality to be within the observer, within humans, we must define what exactly morality is. A person’s morals are basically what he can or can’t do. What I can’t do is not just what I physically can’t do but what I emotionally can’t do. I can physically harm a little girl but emotionally, I would not want to harm her. Thus, I won’t. You may question where such moral emotions come from. Nietzsche explains all human behaviour as symptoms of a ‘will to power’, a will stronger than the will to live. We see in all facets of human behaviour, a desire to propagate one self, to be in a position of power above others, which can be traced back to the simple, evolutionary, Darwinian desire to be the fittest one, which survives, ensuring the propagation of one’s genes. This ‘will to power’ exists within all of us and determines our behaviour in all spheres of life. Of course, there are opposing wills to power- one person’s climb to power will have to impede another’s. “My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on.”[3] Opposing wills to power eventually arrive at a social equilibrium which constitutes the starting point of all morality. For example, in Canadian society, one person does not steal from another because he does not wish anyone else to steal from him. Thus, in a very selfish, ego-centric manner, Man does not cheat or lie or steal, because he does not wish others to do it to him. Thus, what Man can’t do is not a simply a statement about his physical abilities but takes into consideration this social equilibrium. Anything that breaks this equilibrium is immoral or bad, anything that propagates or maintains this equilibrium or lies within the parameters of this equilibrium is good. For example, while looking at a little girl, I could be a nice guy and pet her head and walk on. Or, I could be a pedophile. However, if I am a pedophile and if I carry out my hidden desires, I am breaking the social equilibrium which had equalized at the point where people are not permitted to carry out paedophilic desires. Thus, a pedophile’s action is wrong, is immoral, is ‘bad’. Man is a social animal and has been interacting in society, in whatever form, from a very early stage in its evolution. Thus, such social equilibriums have been in place since the conception of society itself- hence, now the desire to remain within the social equilibrium is innate within most of us- resulting in the moral emotions we were talking about earlier. Another analogy would be the incident where you are running late to class and an old woman moves into your path. Even if you are free to get away without anyone saying anything or thinking anything, you still feel this feeling of remorse and hence you are not really getting away. If you yourself feel no remorse and no one else feels remorse and the old lady feels no indignation at being pushed over, the societal equilibrium will be the point where you push her over and keep running and hence you are not morally obliged to stop. But since the old lady cares, and you care and people around you care, there are conflicting wills to power and thus there is equilibrium where you don’t push the lady.
Such a conception of morality allows for moral disagreement about different values and different virtues in varied societies around the world, since social equilibriums in different societies will be different. For example, polygamy is considered a ‘virtue’ in some societies and a ‘vice’ in some- this is basically due to different societal wills to power. Maybe in a patriarchal society, important treaties or alliances or agreements were cemented with the marriage of a daughter of one family to the son of the other family, thus allowing a man to have many wives. In a more matriarchal society, the will to power would result in the putting onto a pedestal the woman of the house- resulting in polygamy being regarded as a vice. A will to power in a traditional African society would require the son of the household to kill his first lion with a spear to prove his valour and his deservedness to lead the tribe. The same tribe would question, say a European society, which condemns this killing as ‘bad’ but which does not consider levelling large tracts of pristine forests for construction to be necessarily a ‘bad’ thing. Thus, within such a moral theory, widespread moral disagreement is countered by this concept of different societal equilibriums.
This moral theory provides a more sound moral insight than utilitarianism since it is a morality rooted in oneself. It centers the source of morality within yourself- you look to propagate yourself to a position of power, you look to your own ‘good’ rather than a vague collective ‘good’ which utilitarianism demands. This point can also be laid in defence of this theory against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Here, the exemplar is not some ‘wise and virtuous man’ but yourself. Even discarding the infinite regress started if one questioned who the wise man’s exemplar was, this theory simply is easier to follow since you follow your inherent will to power, moving towards what puts you in a position in a power, which is basically limited by the societal equilibrium. You can escape the difficulties of following the actions of an external being- who is also absent- a common argument against virtue ethics.
Also, this theory does not require a prior belief in God- not only leading to circular reasoning of theo-centric morality (What is good? That which is like God. Why should I be like God? Because it’s good to be like God)[4], but it also removes from that which is human, it degrades us into being creatures created by a greater, more intelligent creature- to whom such attributes I would prefer not to grant so easily. “Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate, our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond measure, it is our light and not our darkness that frightens us”[5] – our own power frightens us and we pretend to project it on this external being we call God. Theists needed this conception of God to reinforce the need for human to conform to the very human concept of morality. When asked about the place of God in my moral theory, I would like to answer as Laplace famously did when asked by Napoleon where the place of God was in his models, “I have no need for that hypothesis.” Thus, a belief in my moral theory does not require an inherently irrational belief in God, it requires the Cartesian belief that you yourself exist (cogito ergo sum), it goes past the difficulties in interpreting what such a God would have actually said- which basically requires a blind belief in the words of a rabbi, a priest, a pundit or an imam. Einstein himself said “I consider ethics to be an exclusively human concern with no superhuman authority behind it.” They say religion is the only thing that makes a good man do bad things. Every crusader seeking to change societal equilibriums in other societies is basically motivated by this belief that there is only one universal moral code which his God espouses- thus giving rise to the need to convert other societies to the same moral code. This problem does not exist within this moral theory since a societal equilibrium does not have universal qualities like the three 0s (omni-benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient) embodied in most Gods. These qualities rationally discard the possibility of another God with the same qualities- thus any other God would have to be false or inferior. However, it is irrational to claim that societal equilibriums are better or worse than another since such a hierarchy would not arise- an equilibrium being simply a point of opposing forces cancelling each other out.
In conclusion, a critic of this theory would be that it is unstable- such societal equilibriums being in constant flux might lead to confusion about what exactly such a moral theory requires of us. The same societies may arrive at different societal equilibriums- being subject to changing wills to power. However, we return to the source of all morality- humans themselves. For a constantly evolving, adapting and changing species, a concept as rooted in our fickle nature as morality, one cannot expect constancy or universalization, which is exactly why theories like Kant’s categorical imperative fail. This theory emphatically discards the universalization of morals and allows the light of morality to rest within those beings powerful beyond measure that we call humans.
“We ask ourselves, Who am I to be brilliant, gorgeous, talented, fabulous? Actually, who are you not to be? Your playing small does not serve the world. There is nothing enlightened about shrinking so that other people won't feel insecure around you. We are all meant to shine, as children do. We were born to make manifest the glory of Mankind that is within us. It's not just in some of us; it's in everyone. And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give other people permission to do the same. As we are liberated from our own fear, our presence automatically liberates others.”[6]
[1] Jolley, Nicholas. Locke: His Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999
[2] Pojman, Louis P. "Ethical Relativism Versus Ethical Objectivism." Introduction to Philosophy- Classical and Contemporary Readings. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. New York: Oxford UP, 2004. 489-498.
[3] Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. 636-640.
[4] Johns, Richard. Rev. of Philosophy Presentation 2, by Jeet Chatterjee. 1-2.
[5] Williamson, Marianne. A Return to Love: Reflections on the Principles of "a Course in Miracles. 1st ed. New York: Harper Collins, 1992. 267-268.
[6] Ibid